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EDITORIAL NOTES

AN INEQmTABLE PREFERENCE IN FAVOR OF SURETY ComPANIES.* - The case of Central Trust Company v. Bank of Mullens is the
third West Virginia case in which the court by direct decision or
dictum has recognized the right of a surety company which underwrites a state depository bond, to be preferred to the general
creditors of an insolvent bank.2 Indeed this case goes a step
further than the previous cases in establishing the right of the
surety company by giving the surety company a claim for interest
*Mr. Wilson Anderson of the Student Board of Editors collected the
authorities ciced in this note.
1150 S. E. 221 (W. Va. 1929).
2 Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Central Trust Co., 95 W. Va. 458, 121 S. E.
430 (1923) ; County Court v. Mfatthews, 99 W, Va. 483, 129 S. E. 399, 52
A. L. R. 751 (1925). In the last mentioned case the court held that a state
may have a prerogative right to a preference but that a county, even though
an arm of the state, has no sovereignty and therefore is not entitled to preference on the theory of high prerogative. The following two cases involve
essentially the same question. Wpodyard P. Sayre, 90 W..Va. 295, 110 S.
E. 689, 24 A. L. R. 1497 (1922) ; Myers P. Miller, 45 W. Va. 595, 31 S. E.
976 (1899).
Here the surety on an official bond of a defaulting sheriff
claimed the right to be subrogated to the prerogative priority of the state.
Both cases held that the state had such prerogative right and that the
surety was entitled to be subrogated to that prior right. The Woodyard
Case is the leading case on the question of state prerogative in West Virginia and is mainly relied on in the case under discussion,
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at six per cent up to the time of payment by the bank, three per
cent being preferred. Interest on deposits cease at the time of
insolvency, so far as pro-rata distribution is concerned, and such
deposits are not allowed the legal rate of interest for money
wrongfully withheld." The surety company, on the other hand,
is treated better in this respect than the depositor. It appears to
have a claim against the assets (as distinguished from a claim
against the bank) for six per cent after date of insolvency
whereas the depositor gets interest only until insolvency. It is
hard to see a reason for this advantage to the Surety. The surety
company may also have a preferred claim for three per cent on the
theory that the state would have had a prerogative right to that
much interest. While objection might be made to allowing the
surety company this additional preferred claim for interest, still
it is not an illogical addition to the former decisions allowing
it a preferred claim.
The question immediately arises, why should a surety company
which is supposed to be taking a risk for profit, be permitted to
escape that risk through the medium of the device of subrogation
to the prerogative right of the state? It is submitted that the
West Virginia Supreme Court has relieved the surety company
on a depository bond from practically all risk. There are practically no cases in West Virginia where the assets of an insolvent
bank were not sufficient to pay at least the preferred claims. The
result seems to be one of extraordinary injustice to the general
depositors. The state does not need this preference because it is
protected by its bond. The bonding company does not need it
because it is paid for taking a risk and makes a profit on its business as a whole.4 Why, then, should it be given this gratuitous
present of a large portion of the bank's assets to the detriment of
that deluded class of individuals who think of debts owed to them
8 It should be noted that there is d difference between allowing interest
against the assets and similar allowance against the bank. As against the
assets interest is calculated'only to the date of suspension and the vesting
of title to the assets in the receiver. No interest is allowed thereafter. As
against the bank or its stockholders interest will be allowed on all claims
from the date of insolvency or suspension. Therefore a suit for interest, or
the claim of a creditor, out of surplus assets should be against the stockholders or the bank and not against the receiver. 7 C. J. Banks & Banking,
532, 847, 848; White v. Knox, 111 U. S. 784, 4 S. Ct. 686 (1883) ; MORSE,
BANws AND BANKING, Vol. II, p. 1909, par. 250.
4 Bonding companies are not preferred in the case of national banks.
See notes 12 and 13,
nor are they preferred by many state courts.

infra.
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by banks as "cash in the bank", and who have no idea of the risks
they are taking.5
We can think of only two reasons why a court would want to
reach such a result. (1) That they were compelled to do so by
inexorable logic; (2) that by giving the bonding company this
preference they might accomplish some social or economic advantage, such as a decrease in the premium on bonds. Let us briefly
examine these two suppositions.
First, what is the logic of the situation? It seems to have been
pretty generally held that a state has a preferred claim against
the assets of an insolvent bank because of its royal prerogative.
This is based on the historical accident that the King of England
had more power than he had any business to have. It has been
repeated so often in this country, however, that it may be said
to have become "a settled principle of law'".0 To say that the state
has a prerogative, however, does not necessarily mean that the bonding company has a preferred claim. That result is only reached
when we have said that the bonding company is "subrogated" to
the rights of the state. Do we have to so hold? Subrogation
according to the atmosphere of the familiar generalizations, is
supposed to be a doctrine which rests upon the principles of natural
equity and good conscience. 7 "It will not be ordered when the
party claiming it has in fact been reimbursed and has thus sustained no loss". If the state had collateral security we would
5 There is an important difference between depositors in an insolvent
bank and general creditors in a business foilure. Banks are protected by
state banking laws and depositors are encouraged to put their money in
banks rather than hoard it by inducing them to believe that a bank deposit is not like a loan. A general creditor of an insolvent bank or a
person who lends money on the credit of the debtor should not be classed
with a depositor who does not consider that he has loaned money on the
credit of anyone.
6Re Churchill, L. R. 39 Ch. Div. 174 (1888); Central Bank & Trust
Co. v. Georgia, 139 Ga. 54, 76 S. E. 587 (1912); State v. Bank of Maryland, 6 Gill. & J. 205, 26 Am. Dec. 561 (1834); Rankin v. Madison State
Bank, 68 Mont. 342, 218 Pac. 652 (1923); Re Carnegie Trust Co., 206 N.
Y. 390, 99 N. E. 1096 (1912); Fidelity & D. Co. v. State Bank, 117
Ore. 1, 242 Pac. 823 (1926); Md. Casualty Co. v. McConnell, 148 Tenn.
656, 257 S. W. 410 (1923); National Surety Co. v. Morris, 34 Wyo. 134,
241 Pac. 1063 (1925), here state held to have waived prerogative right
by taking security-otherwise prerogative right); American Bonding
Co. v. Reynolds, 203 Fed. 356 (1913); Marshall P. N. Y., 254 U. S. 380,
65 L. ed. 315, 41 S. Ct. 447 (1920); U. S. F. & G. v. McFerson, 78 Colo.
338, 241 Pac. 728 (1925); Dennis v. Maynard, 15 Ill. 477 (1854); Re
Holland Banking Co., 313 Mo. 307, 281 S. W. 702 (1926); Booth &
Flinn v. Miller, 237 Pa. 297, 85 Atl. 457 (1912); also cases cited supra,
n. 2. See also a collection of cases 34 W. VA. L. QuAn. 317.
737 Cyc. 363; 25 R. C. L. 1311.
8 37 CO.

370, 371.
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have no difficulty in saying that it was fair for the bonding company to get the advantage of that collateral security, because it is
not part of the general unpledged assets of the bank which closes.
To hand the collateral to the depositors instead of the surety company would be giving them an unexpected windfall. Does it
follow, however, that this historical anachronism called a prerogative should be treated as collateral security? Why should the
sovereign, in the absence of statutory direction, loan his crown,
even temporarily, to a surety company? Of course if we say he
has done so that settles the matter, but there is no logical necessity
of our saying so. Is it really similar to the ordinary case of equitable subrogation? The West Virginia Supreme Court had very
respectable authority behind it when it allowed this subrogation9
but that does not necessarily make the result sound.
The highest courts of at least four states have rejected th- theory
of prerogative right. 10 Other states, while paying lip service to
the doctrine of royal prerogative, have denied the surety company
claim on the ground that the state has waived its prerogative by
requiring security." These cases are just as logical as the West
Virginia decision.
There is no such preference given to surety companies when a
national bank fails. 2 The reason for the difference is supposed
to be the United States Statute 8 which distributes the claims
ratably among the creditors. However such a result does not
necessarily follow from such a statute because various other kinds
of preferred claims, based on trust relationships, are allowed
against receivers of insolv~fit national banks. As a result in West
9 Supra, n. 6.
10 Potter -u. Fidelity & D. Co., 101 Miss. 823, 58 So. 713 (1911);
Commissioner v. Chelsa Savings Bank, 161 Mich. 691, 125 N. W. 424
(1910), rehearing 161 Mich. 704, 127 N. W. 351 (1910); Middlesex Co.
v. State Bank, 29 N. J. Eq. 268 (187F) affirmed 30 N. J. Eq. 311; N. C.
Corp. Comm. v. Citizens Bank & T. Co., 193 N. C. 513, 137 S. E. 587, 51
A. L. R. 1350, note at 1355 (1927).
"Maryland Casualty Co. v. Rainwater, 173 Ark. 103, 291 S. W,. 1003,
51 A. L. R. 1332 (1927); Re Central Bank, 23 Ariz. 574, 205 Pac. 915
(1922) ; U. S. F. & G. Co. v. MFearson, supra, n. 6; Re Holland Banking Co., supra, n. 6; Nat. Surety Co. v. Morris, 34 Wyo. 134, 241 Pac.
1063 (1925); Nat. Surety Co. v. Pixton, 60 Utah 289, 208 Pac. 878, 24 A.
L. R. 1487 (1922).
12 First Nat. Bank v. Selden, 120 Fed. 212, 62 L. R. A. 559 (1903);
Cook Co. Nat. Bank v. U. S., 107 U. S. 445 (1882) ; Davis v. Elmira
Bank, 161 U. S. 275, 16 S. Ct. 502 (1896); Palo Alto Co. v. Ulrich, 199
Ia. 1, 201 N. W. 132 (1924). At p. 134 the Court says, "In the winding
up of national banks by federal authorities, the state lavq cannot displace the federal statute providing for a ratable distribution among creditors."
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Virginia a bonding company takes much less risk in underwriting
state deposits for state banks than for national banks.
Let us examine the second ground upon which the preference
to the bonding company might be justified, i. e., that it is socially
or economically desirable to give the bonding company a preferred
claim. Two possible advantages occur to us. (1) That it would
make it easier for a state 'bank to get a depository bond than a
national bank. (2) That it would make the rates for depository
bonds less for state banks than for national banks.
As to the first there is no evidence that a sound national bank
has any more difficulty in getting itself bonded than a state bank.
If the decision enables an unsound state bank to get bonds it certainly does not achieve anything worthwhile.
As to the second ground we quote a letter from the Towner
Rating Bureau to the secretary of the West Virginia Banking Association, in answer to a request for lower rates on state depository
bonds, on account of this preference.
The Towner Rating Bureau of New York recommends the rates
for most of the leading surety companies in the United States.
The explanation of the Towner Rating Bureau showing why they
refused to take this factor into account discloses that the bonding
companies feel that the result of giving them a preferred claim is
so absurd that they are unwilling to base a rate even on a decision
of the Supreme Court. They frankly admit the injustice of the
preference given to them. We quote the letter:
TOWNER RATING BUREAU
160 Broadway
New York
May 20, 1927.
West Virginia-State Depository Bonds.
J. S. Hill, Esq.,
Secy., West Virginia Banker's Association,
Charleston, West Virginia.
Dear Sir:
I have your favor of May 17th instant. Experience has led us
to seriously distrust any statute or decision of State Courts which
apparently would favor surety companies by making State Deposits
preferred claims in case of the failure of the banks. We were
2s U. S. R. S. Par. 5236; 12 U. S. C. A. Par. 194; Acts of June 3, 1864,
ch, 106, par. 106, par. 50, 13 Stat. 114.
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urged to take this supposed factor into account as contributing to
the safety of surety companies on Public Deposits in the States of
Mississippi and Iowa." In both States we refused to do so. Depository Bond Underwriters, nevertheless, wrote some Depository
Bonds in these States in which they relied on the expectation that
the deposits covered by the bond would be preferred deposits in
case the bank failed. When the banks failed and the situation was
disclosed that very large Public Deposits were protected by corporate surety bonds and application was made to have these deposits
preferred as to claims against the assets of the bank there was a
great public outcry echoed by all the local newspapers in both
States. The result was that the Supreme Court reversed itself and
declined to allow any preference and the surety companies had to
pay just as though Public Deposits were not preferred. We don't
necessarily assert that the result would be perhaps the same in
West Virginia, but we think that a supposed or expected preference
for any class of deposits is not sufficient ground for making reduced
premium on Depository Bonds. Underwriters can take it into
account if they want to, and in two cases as I have said, they
found themselves leaning on a broken reed.
Sooner or later every State gets away from "preferred" deposits.
They are a rank injustice to everyone concerned. They rob the
innocent individual depositors in the bank who cannot afford to
lose and divert the money which otherwise would be paid to them
in order to pay it to the State which can afford to lose better.
14 In Mississippi the question was regarded as settled that that state did
not have a prerogative right by the case of Shields v. Thomas, 71 Miss.
260, 14 So. 84 (1893). In 1908 a statute providing for the establishing of
state depositories (Laws of Miss. 1908, ch. 96, § 11) was passed by virtue
of which it was thought that state funds were preferred. As a result
the case of Potter v. Fidelity & D. Co., supra, n. 10, came before the Mississippi Supreme Court. In this case the court reaffirmed its former stand
and has maintained this position sinc* in a later decision. The Iowa court
has not been so consistent. In the much cited case of In re Marathon Savings Bank, 198 Ia. 696, 196 N. W. 729 (1924) rehearing 198 Ia. 692, 200 N.
W. 199, the court held that the Iowa statute was declaratory of the common
law (1913 Supp. 3825a) which allowed the state prerogative and that it was
not in conflict with the state banking act (Code 1897, Par. 1877). By virtue
of an amendment to the State Banking Act (Code 1924, Par. 9130 to 9154)
the court took a different stand when the question was again presented in
Leach v. Exchange Bank, 200 Ia. 185, 203 N. W. 31 (1925). In this case a
preference was denied because of the change in statute. J. Arthur, concurred
in the' result but was of the opinion that the 1924 statute did not affect
the situation and that the Marathon Case had been decided wrongly. Since
the Leach Case the Iowa court has maintained its position of net allowing
a preferential claim. Leach v. Commercial Bank, 205 Ia. 975, 213 N. W. 517
(1927) ; Poweshiek Co. v. Merchants Bank, 220 N. W. 63, (Ia. 1928). Both
Of these were county cases but reaffirmed the former position.
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Moreover, if the State will take good corporate surety bonds to
protect its deposits it need not have any loss and the individual
depositors can then share pro rata with the State in all the assets
of the closed bank. We are utterly opposed to any preference of
State Deposits. We think them a rank injustice when they are
granted and we consider them a mere trap for surety companies
to entice them to give suretyship for banks which otherwise might
not get it. Then when the bank closes sureties find that they had
no preference after all, as recently in Iowa. We are opposed to
any reduction of premium on account of supposed preference-by the State or anyone else.
Yours very truly,
R. H. Towner."
The figures of the Banking Commissioner for 1929 show the havoc
which these decisions are working among depositors in West Virginia banks.15 In most instances the preferred claims given to
surety companies amounted to about ten per cent of the entire
balances. Assuming that the bank paid fifty cents on the dollar,
these preferred claims mean that a dividend of five per cent is
taken away from depositors and given to surety companies.
In the case of Lumberport Bank, which failed on the 27th of
August, 1929, the state's claim amounted to more than one-third
of the total assets. When we consider the fact that the state in
the recent Mullens Bank Case seems by implication to have added
to this list of preferred claims all the drafts outstanding ° we

15 Date Closed Name of Bank

Total
Deposits

Stat e Other Pref. Trust
Balance s Claims Al- Fund

Monongahela
Bank $ 477,114.17 41,350.00
Peoples Bank of W. Va.
635,618.09 24,433.78
Clarksburg Trust Co. 1,529,246.79 174,379.60
Bank of Jacksonburg
47,467.85
Tunnelton Bank
394,080.98 62,356.83
Lumberport Bank
147,117.09 49,800.00
Pullman State Bank
126,523.02
Auburn Exchange Bank 129,376.96
Bank of Cairo
427,652.34 32,095.63
M. & M. Savings
Bank Grafton
459,885.43
6,102.50
11-21-29 Peoples Bank, Phillippi 304,600.88 35,988.21
12-14-29 Farmers Bank
Clarksburg
723,843.22 61,125.00
1-21-29
2-4 -29
6-6 -29
6-22-29
7-22-29
8-27-29
9-4 -29
9-6 -29
9-21-29
10-22-29

5,402,526.93 487,631.55
10 Central Trust v. Bank of Mullens, 150 S. E. 137

lowed.
3,914.17
28,963.71
33,565.15 39,664.08
48.98
2,552.17
394.37
56.89
919.59

72,415.03 39,684.06
(W. Va. 1929). Soo

note elsewhere in this issue.
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can see how little of the assets are left available for the general
depositors in such a case.
This rule giving a preference to bonding companies seems to
have no reason for its existence. The beneficiaries of this rule are
themselves loudest in its denunciation. How then did such a rule
come into being? The answer is easy in West Virginia. Bonding
companies were given a preference because the great weight of
authority at the time the question arose gave them a preference.
There was not enough public interest at the time to create a critical
examination of the rule, and offset the weight of authority. Why,
however, did the majority of decisions outside of West Virginia
uphold this preference? If we examine the dates of these cases
it is not difficult to hazard a plausible guess. The first case in this
country was decided in 18341' and followed the English view.18
There are very few cases involving this point between 1834 and 1920.
This, no doubt, is due to the fact that it was not until more recent
years that states sought to protect their deposits by bonds and
not until then did bonding companies become engaged in this business on a large scale. Obviously the chances favor a decision for
the bonding company unless some publib interest is aroused, just
as they favor every aggressive litigant who has as his opponent a
litigant who is not affected by the case. It makes no difference
to the receiver to whom he pays the money of the insolvent bank.
Depositors are almost always unrepresented and the receiver is an
uninterested litigant. To this fact we may attribute not only
the inequitable results in giving preferences to bonding companies
but countless other preferred claims which have been sanctioned
and which are obviously unjust to the general depositor. After
1920 bank failures became so numerous and state deposits in insolvent banks are so large that in some states the public took an
interest. The states which have refused to allow the preference
are Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Wyoming, Mississippi and Iowa.19
Each one of these decisions wat rendered at a time when public
attention was focused on bank failures because of the agricultural
depression existing in those states. In Iowa the depositors were
represented by newspapers and general public discussion, sufficient
in volume to make the court consider the equity of the situation.
A re-examination of the preference found it so hollow that the
court reversed itself. It might very plausibly be said that every
Maryland, supra, u. 6.
Churchill, supra, n. 6.

17 State v. Bank of
1lRe

19 Supra, n. 11.
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2ourt whose attention has been called to this problem through
information gleaned outside of the dry arguments of counsel has
decided against this preference.
The final question which will be discussed is whether the West
Virginia Supreme Court might properly reverse itself on this question or whether they should leave the remedy to the legislature.
Anyone who has had experience with legislatures will recognize
that the probability of the legislature locking the barn door is
greatest after the horse has been stolen. Unless there is a widespread series of bank failures in this state the chances are that
the legislative branch of the government will not bother with the
subject. ,As proof of this we cite the fact that legislatures in
other states have not bothered with it and further the fact that a
bill taking away this preference was vetoed by Governor Gore
without any particular comment on anybody's part. Therefore,
if the West Virginia Supreme Court does not correct itself on
decision it is not likely it will not be corrected until public sentiment has been attracted to the question by a large number of
failures and much criticism directed toward the courts for this
inequitable preference.
As against both the advisability and the probability of the West
Virginia Supreme Court reversing itself sometime in the future
stands the ancient principle of stare decisis. At one time this
would have been sufficient answer. Today it is no longer so. Our
court has reversed itself several times. Instances of the changing
attitude towards stare deeisis in the West Virginia court have
been collected in a very able article by Professor Hardman.2
20 32

W. Va. L. Quar. 163.
The West Virginia Supreme Court has shown a tendency during the past
two decades to fit the law to existing social and economic progress and has
not felt itself bound to the rule of stare decisis which at one time governed
its decisions. This is evidenced by statements in several cases. W. Va.
Architects & Builders v. Stewart, 68 Wt Va. 506, 515, 70 S. E. 113 (1911)
where the court quotes WIGUORE, EVIDENCE, Par. 1530 (1st ed. 1904): "In
short courts must cease to be pedantic and endeavor to be practical." To the
same effect "We think the practical administration of justice between parties
is more the duty of the court than the preservation of some esoteric (legal)
theory". Jones v. Cook, 90 W,. Va. 710, 717, 111 S. E. 828 (1922). In the
case of Ralston v. Town of Weston, 46 W. Va. 544, 33 S. E. 326 (1899),
the court reversed a "settled precedent" which had been established by
several decisions. City of Wheeling v. Campbell, 12 W1 Va. 36 (1877);
Teass v. City of St. Albans, 38 W. V& 1, 17 S. E. 400 (1893).
There is
further evidence that our present court refuses to be bound by former decisions. In the case of Woodyard 1. Sayre, supra, n. 2, the headnote distinctly
applies the state prerogative to counties. This is directly overruled in the
latter case of County Court v. Matthews, supra, n. 2.

A recent instance of reversal by the West Virginia Supreme Court was
Ashland Finance Co. v. Dudley, 98 W. Va. 255, 127 S. E. 33 (1925)
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The rule of stare decisis is not a binding limitation on the
courts, but only a self-imposed restraint. 21 When it results in an
inequitable decision the reasons are usually among the following:
(a) Inertia on the part of the court; (b) failure to see how an
equitable result can be obtained without disrupting the logical
system on which other rules hang; (c) fear of social or economic
consequences to interests which have relied on the former decision.
The case of preferences of bonding companies is a case peculiarly
outside the reason for the application of the rule of stare decisis.
In the first place there has been no reliance on this rule by the
bonding company in making their rates. In fact their attitude
has been just the opposite. They refuse to believe that the Supreme
Court would sustain the rule if public attention were called to it
by a number of bank failures. In the second place the rule applies
to such a narrow class of cases that it has no reverberating effects
on the general logical system of either the law of subrogation,
banks and banking, or trusts. No body of law has been built up
on the principle of allowing surety companies preferred claims
which would be weakened by reversal. In other words, it has no
disastrous logical consequences. The only possible confusion
which might arise from a reversal of this case would be a query
as to the liabilities of receivers who have paid out money relying
on the old rule. Of course our theory of law that each judicial
decision represents the law as it always has been and the variance
between this theory and the facts always creates a query as to the
rights of people who have relied on a former decision before it was
reversed. It is for that reason that the Iowa court, while reversing
itself, was very careful to hang its reversal on an intervening
statute, even though it had nothing to do with the case. That
device silenced queries as to the rights of parties who had relied
on the former decision. Nevertheless it can scarcely be argued for
a moment that receivers who had relied on the former decision
would be held liable for money previously paid out. The objection
therefore seems to be rather imaginary.
We submit therefore that the rule allowing bonding companies
Hatcher, J., says that precedent had "become a judicial pariah in our reports."
Brannon, J., said, "No legal principle is ever settled until it is settled
right." Where vital and important public and private rights are concerned,
and the decisions regarding them have a direct and permanent influence in
all future time, it becomes the duty, as well as the right of the court to
consider them carefully, and to allow no previous error to continue if it can
be corrected. Town of Weston v. Ralston, 48 Wi Va. 181, 36 S. E. 446

(1900).

21 76 Pa. T. Rev. 481 (March, 1928).
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a preference in the case of insolvent state banks has no justification
whatever and that it occupies a peculiar position of being disowned even by its beneficiaries, the bonding companies. It is
further one of those rare classes of case where the West Virginia
Supreme Court may reverse its former holding without interfering
either with its system of logical principles or with any vested social
or economic interest which had been built up under the former
rule.

-T.
GiFT OF

A

W. ARNOLD,

LiFE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE PowERn or .DisPosAL BY

DFED.-A testator ought to be permitted to dispose of his property
by will in accordance with his desires, and if his intent appears
from his language, such intent should be effectuated by the law
unless there are good reasons of policy to the contrary. But there
have been rules of property law which have operated to defeat
intent. The classic example is the Rule in Shelley's Case, which
in this state is partially abolished by statute,' and should the
proposed revision of the Code be enacted by the Legislature will
be completely destroyed. Such a rule of construction of words,
which is entirely contrary to the ordinary meaning of such words
as understood by the layman, is a dangerous trap for one who
makes a will or conveys property by deed. The courts of Virginia, in a case officially published in 1871, followed some thirty
years later by those of West Virginia, have established another
dangerous trap for one who makes a will or deed which is on a
par with the notorious Rule in Shelley's Case. This is the now
firmly established rule of property law that where there is a gift
for life, followed by a general power to dispose of the fee by deed,
the estate created is not a life estate with power of disposal, but
is an absolute fee simple estate. 2 Like the Rule in Shelley's
Case this is a fixed rule of construction of language, and
the courts hold it means what the one who used it clearly did not
mean. A recent case 8 furnishes an example of the operation of
this rule. A testator by the fourth clause of his will devised all
the residue of his property to his wife "for and during the term
of her natural life . . .to be used and enjoyed by her for her
1 CODE OF W. VA., oh. 71, § 11.
2Ogden v. Maxwell, 104 W. Va. 553; 140 S. E. 554

(1927); National
Surety Co. v. Jarrett, 95 W. Va. 420, 121 S. E. 291 (1924) ; Blake v.
Blake, 92 W. Va. 663, 115 S. E. 794 (1923); Morgan v. Morgan, 60 W Va.

327, 55 S.E. 389 (1906).
3 Ogden P.Maxwell, supra.
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